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Drawing on interviews with social movements and organizations in Mexico 
and Spain, this paper sheds light on the dynamics of ‘backstage activism’ 
with a focus on WhatsApp. It illustrates how activists have integrated this 
app into their media ecologies to reinforce collective identity, cement 
internal solidarity and lower the pressure of protest. It shows that within 
WhatsApp groups, campaigners have countered the paranoia experienced 
in the frontstage of social media exchanging ironical material and intimate 
messages. It demonstrates that WhatsApp has been used as a robust 
organizational device and it is now firmly integrated into the mechanisms 
of organizations and movements. Its communicative affordances (speed, 
reliability, mobility, multimediality) in conjunction with the omnipresent 
smartphone are often emphasized. Nuancing characterizations that tend to 
either disregard its role or stress its negative side, this qualitative 
exploration foregrounds the banality of WhatsApp. This article unpacks the 
multiple roles of this app within the submerged practices of movements 
and organizations.
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Introduction and outline
Drawing on three case studies from Mexico and Spain, this paper 
contributes to the burgeoning reflections on the relevance of WhatsApp for 
social movements and political organizations. It advances two critical 
points. First, it reflects on the mismatch between the use of WhatsApp by 
activists and organizations and the interest of academia in the political role 
of WhatsApp. The overreliance on quantitative methodologies and 
analytics that overtly focus on data from the ‘frontstage’ of digital media 
platforms has somehow prevented researchers from fully appreciating the 
relevance of ‘backstage’ activist practices, including the role of WhatsApp 
within the dynamics of social movements. This relevance predates 
academic attention to the political role of WhatsApp that we have 
witnessed in recent years, with activists from the 15M in Spain and the 
#YoSoy132 movement in Mexico effectively incorporating this platform 
into their protest media ecologies since 2011 and 2012, respectively. The 
second point that this article advances is that, beyond characterizations of 
this app that predominantly frame it as a malicious incubator and spreader 
of fake news and misinformation, WhatsApp has already been integrated 
into the everyday dynamics of social movements and organizations. Within 
these environments, WhatsApp functions as a powerful ‘backstage’ 
communicative tool that reinforces internal solidarity, facilitates 
organizational processes and fulfills several activities. Hence, this paper 
illustrates the mundanity and banality of WhatsApp and unpack its 
multiple roles within the media ecologies of social movements and political 
organizations.
Literature review
The rise of WhatsApp
WhatsApp defines itself as a “fast, simple, secure messaging and calling” 
app, and a “reliable way to talk to anyone in the world”. Its remarkable 
growth in the decade since its January 2009 release has earned it one of 
the largest user bases in the world, with more than 1.5 billion users in 
over 180 countries [1]. Its simplicity, reliability and accessibility are some 
of its core selling points, especially for people in the Global South where 
online services are accessed mainly through cellphones and several 
connectivity and bandwidth issues are often thwarting a rapid and fluid 
digital experience. The app considers every phone number as a user and 
automatically adds the phone’s contact list as a WhatsApp contact. The 
platform enables voice and video calls, video and voice messages, sharing 
of images, PDF documents and location to both individual contacts and 
groups. WhatsApp groups function allows personal communications 
between groups of up to 256 users and represent one of the most popular 
features of the app. This specific affordance renders the app more similar 
to a social media (see for instance Facebook groups), rather than just a 
basic text-messaging service. In 2014, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp 
was one of the company’s largest investments to date. In 2016, end-to-
end encryption was introduced. Research shows that WhatsApp’s 
encryption is performative rather than being a core value of the company 
(Santos and Faure, 2018) and that this does not mean that Facebook is 
not in a position to gather WhatsApp data (Zanon, 2018). This move to 
encryption has also generated controversies from governments, digital 
rights groups and law enforcement authorities. For instance, although 
praised by some privacy advocates, the implementation of encryption has 
been criticized by government agencies as a barrier to fighting crime. It is 
clear that WhatsApp is much more than an advanced text-messaging 
service, but can we describe it as a platform? This point is controversial. In 
his recent book about content moderation, Gillespie [2] argues that 
messaging services like WhatsApp that “are generally person-to-person or 
group-to-group, and overwhelmingly between known contacts (...) 
sidestep many of the problems that plague platforms that offer public 
visibility and contact with strangers”. Further, Gillespie sees moderation as 
one of the essential requirements for being considered a platform, but 
since WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption makes it impossible for it to be 
effectively moderated, this service would not qualify as a platform. For 
other researchers, “WhatsApp does operate as a media platform where 
communication happens and where information is constructed, shared, 
and discussed” (Pereira and Bojczuk, 2018). In this article, I will 
indiscriminately use the words service, app and platform to refer to 
WhatsApp, keeping in mind that moderation is still a contested issue 
within this app, but also considering that WhatsApp shares many of the 
characteristics and complex affordances (as well as social and political 
influence) of other mainstream social media platforms like Facebook and 
YouTube.
The computational turn and the eclipse of the backstage of digital 
activism
WhatsApp was released in 2009, and, together with many other digital 
technologies and applications, it has been an integral part of the protest 
ecologies of the many social movements that have emerged since 2010 all 
over the world. It is now one of the most powerful digital services for 
political campaigning, especially in the Global South, in countries as 
diverse as Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Mexico and Malaysia [3]. Yet, in the 
several studies that have flourished around digital protest and activism 
since 2009 the role of this app has been generally overlooked, with the 
academic gaze firmly oriented towards social media platforms like Twitter 
and Facebook. Indeed, a critical appraisal of the role of WhatsApp within 
activists’ practices is absent in some of the most representative and cited 
texts on contemporary digital media/social media and protest, including 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013), Gerbaudo (2012), Barassi (2015), Wolfson 
(2014), Kaun (2016), Fuchs (2014), Russell (2016), Dencik and Leistert 
(2015), Castells (2012), Mortensen, et al. (2019), Cammaerts (2018) and 
Margetts, et al. (2016).
Recently however, there have been some attempts to explore the role of 
WhatsApp (along with other digital technologies like Facebook or mobile 
messages) as a platform for workers’ unionization (Lazar, et al., 2018), in 
Malaysia’s regime change (Tapsell, 2019), in the empowerment of 
Nigerian women (Abubakar and Dasuki, 2018), in the Occupy Nigeria 
protest of 2012 (Uwalaka, 2018) and in Sierra Leone’s 2018 elections 
(Dwyer, et al., 2019). Furthermore, new studies in political communication 
are now engaging with the role of mobile instant messaging platforms 
together with more ‘traditional’ social media (see, in particular, Gil de 
Zúñiga, et al., 2019; Vaccari and Valeriani, 2018; Valeriani and Vaccari, 
2018).
Still, a pressing question remains: how do we explain the absence of 
WhatsApp in most of the literature of the last decade that deals with 
digital protest and activism? I argue that this is mostly related with the 
digital activism scholarship’s progressive disregard for internal 
communication dynamics within social movements, what I have called 
elsewhere the backstage of digital activism (Treré, 2015). With regard to 
the concepts of front- and backstage activism, I am naturally indebted to 
the work on the self-presentation of the self of Goffman (1959), where the 
Canadian sociologist provides a ‘dramaturgical’ account of social 
interaction as a theatrical performance. When individuals perform a role in 
relation to an audience in public settings, we can think of this as 
frontstage, similar to an actor on stage who is presenting a performance. 
The backstage is instead a space where actors can express aspects of 
themselves in ways that their audience would find unacceptable and where 
performers can relax and step out of character. The literature that has 
applied Goffman’s dramaturgical approach to digital and social media is 
extensive and engaging with it is far from my intentions here. However, 
my application of the Goffman metaphor to digital platforms is slightly 
different from that of most scholars (see, for example, Murthy, 2012). 
Most literature examines how the frontstage/backstage dynamic unfolds 
on Twitter and Facebook’s public posts and streams, while private, internal 
messages and closed groups interactions are usually neglected.
My research instead illustrates that activists consider social media and 
instant messaging platforms as already articulated into frontstage 
(Facebook posts, Twitter feeds, etc.) and backstage spaces (Facebook 
groups and Messenger, Twitter direct messages, WhatsApp 
communications, etc.) that hold different implications, appropriations and 
affordances. The frontstage is seen and seized as an open, visible, public, 
shopfront space for publicity and information diffusion about protest and 
mobilization activities of the movements. The backstage instead is where 
more banal, mundane, submerged, informal, emotionally driven daily 
interactions are performed. The concept is thus used as an entry point into 
the complexity and hybridity of activist practices that continuously 
navigate, merge and differently use both front- and backstage spaces.
The first wave of studies on digital activism in the early 2000s frequently 
centered on the internal communicative dynamics of social movements, 
exploring activists’ practices performed on forums, e-mail messages and 
mailing lists (Ayers, 2003; Hara and Estrada, 2005: Kavada, 2009). But as 
social media like Twitter and Facebook were gaining center stage within 
academic analyses — and a prominent role within activists’ actions too — 
the internal communicative processes and practices carried out by activists 
started to lose relevance for researchers. In part, this is due to the nature 
of social media platforms, where huge amounts of personal data are 
constantly made visible and shared with others on threads, streams and 
groups, raising serious issues of privacy, exploitation and sociality. This 
massive quantity of data produced by activists through their online protest 
activities has contributed to a ‘computational turn’ (Tufecki, 2014) in social 
movements and media studies, that is, a significant growth in the 
application of quantitative methods in the examination of enormous 
protest-related data sets available on platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter. This computational turn has brought a disproportionate focus on 
what is measurable and quantifiable on the front-stage of digital platforms 
(e.g., Twitter streams, Facebook posts, YouTube videos, etc.), at the 
expense of the submerged negotiations and everyday activities that 
mostly unfold in the backstage spaces of digital activism (Facebook chats 
and groups, Twitter direct messages, WhatsApp and Telegram groups, 
etc.). Notwithstanding new critical developments in computational studies 
(Puschmann, 2019), most of the current literature is characterized by an 
excessive attention to dynamics of public, external communication, at the 
expense of internal dynamics and daily communicative exchanges through 
which activists organize, create, and nurture collective identities (Flesher 
Fominaya, 2015). In order to better grasp the limitations of this 
contemporary computational obsession for the frontstage of digital 
activism, we can turn to Alberto Melucci who, few decades ago, was 
already criticizing the political reductionism of many approaches of the 
new social movements where the social and cultural dimensions of 
collective action were underestimated resulting in a “myopia of the 
visible”, that focuses all the attention on the measurable aspects of 
collective action and ignores the production of new cultural codes that 
constitute the “submerged activity of the contemporary movement 
networks and the condition for their visible action” [4].
However, researching social movements entails precisely carrying out 
what Lim (2018) calls ‘an inquiry of the invisible,’ that is, focusing our 
analytical gaze on hidden, submerged, and peripheral places and 
practices, including the dynamics of communication carried out within the 
backstage spaces of contemporary activism.
Beyond a dystopian vision of WhatsApp
In the past few years, and especially after the 2016 presidential elections 
in the U.S., attention from journalists, governments and academics to the 
role of WhatsApp within politics has grown exponentially. WhatsApp has 
attracted harsh criticism for the way it has been used in a variety of 
political scenarios to spread false information, hoaxes, hate speech, 
propaganda and fake news. In 2017, together with Facebook, the platform 
was connected to the spreading of fake news stories during the contested 
general election in Kenya (Dahir, 2017) [5]. In 2018, WhatsApp was 
associated with the diffusion of rumors and disinformation, as well as 
incitements to mob violence and lynching in India (Arun, 2019). In the 
2019 Indian election (Narayanan, et al., 2019), a recent study illustrates 
that “the proportion of polarizing political news and information in 
circulation over social media (...) is worse than all of the other country 
case studies (...), except the U.S. Presidential election in 2016”, with 
misinformation on WhatsApp primarily taking the form of visual content. 
Others have pointed out how Israeli’s tech companies are hacking human 
rights activists’ WhatsApp accounts and creating fake social media profiles 
to undermine democracy (Silverstein, 2019). One of the most underlined 
cases of deployment of WhatsApp for the spread of fake news and 
propaganda is Brazil’s 2018 presidential elections. Brazil is a country 
where WhatsApp has wide diffusion and adoption, but more importantly it 
possesses a powerful cultural relevance that makes it much more than just 
a text-messaging app (Saboia, 2016). It has turned into an omnipresent 
and irreplaceable digital service for Brazilians who have appropriated it to 
manage both professional and private activities: from business 
transactions to interactions with family, colleagues and friends (Pereira 
and Bojczuk, 2018). Within this context, studies show that a significant 
strategy of far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro’s political campaign — now 
president elect of Brazil — consisted in the massive use of fabricated, 
orchestrated and largely automated fake stories and junk news that 
circulated across different social media, with WhatsApp being one of the 
key communicative platforms [6] (Avelar, 2019; Machado, 2018). The role 
of WhatsApp in the spread of false information has prompted scholars and 
civil society organizations to demand changes in the app’s sharing 
functionalities, implementation of fact checking, limitations of forwarding 
and sharing features, and other macro- and micro-level changes. The 
recent WhatsApp’s Research Awards for Social Science and Misinformation 
[7] represent a clear attempt by the company to address issues of safety, 
misinformation, problematic content and behavior within encrypted 
settings. These areas of inquiry are of course of high importance, but 
while we cannot deny that WhatsApp represents a space that often lends 
itself to propagate a ‘dark version of democracy’ (Gapper, 2019), we also 
have to be careful to characterize this platform in a one-dimensional way. 
Across history, digital technologies have always attracted both utopian and 
dystopian visions, and we tend to evaluate them through the recursive 
patterns of optimism and pessimism. Whilst in the aftermath of the 2011 
global insurrections, technologies were heralded with the power to subvert 
regimes and change the world for better, after the election of Trump and 
the Brexit referendum, we have entered a new dystopian phase. Inside 
this new techno-pessimistic scenario, there is a tendency in academia and 
the press to frame WhatsApp as a malicious spreader of fake news and 
propaganda, an enemy of democracy, a weapon in the hands of the status 
quo. My research will instead cast a more nuanced and ambivalent picture, 
showing how this app has been integrated into the protest media ecologies 
and everyday activities of movements and organizations. Activists 
incessantly navigate and make sense of the affordances of the frontstage 
and the backstage of social media, and WhatsApp (along with similar 
apps) has become a key ordinary digital ally, not only a tool that is 
‘weaponized’ during electoral times.
Conceptual framework, case studies and methods
A media ecology approach to WhatsApp-related practices
The conceptual framework within which this article is inscribed is the 
media ecological lens applied to the exploration of the relations between 
social movements and media technologies. The application of this 
approach has grown exponentially in the last years (Treré, 2019, 2012; 
Feigenbaum, et al., 2013; Foust and Hoyt, 2018). The media ecological 
lens aims to disentangle the communicative complexity of social 
movements by focusing on how activists engage holistically and critically 
with a wide ecology of media technologies to organize, mobilize, influence 
public opinion and pursue radical change (Treré, 2019). Inspired by the 
media ecology tradition that conceives media as complex environments, 
the strength of this approach lies in its holistic gaze that does not privilege 
any specific media technology, but instead investigate how activists, in 
their movement-related practices, make sense of, navigate and merge 
newer and older media formats, physical and digital spaces, internal and 
external forms of communication, as well as alternative and corporate 
social media. In the context of this paper, the application of this lens 
entails that we can only assess the role played by WhatsApp within 
movements and political organizations if we evaluate WhatsApp-related 
practices in conjunction with other media technologies, platforms and their 
related communicative dynamics. This implies paying attention to the 
continuous exchanges between the backstage and the frontstage of 
contemporary digital activism, foregrounding the meanings of the 
submerged, mundane, everyday media practices that animate the 
backstage of movements and organizations.
Case studies and methods
The first case study I rely on is the Mexican social movement for media 
democratization #YoSoy132, emerged in 2012 during the Mexican federal 
elections process. Since the Zapatista uprisings, Mexico has always been 
at the forefront of technological innovation in global struggles. It is the 
second Latin American country in terms of numbers of social media users 
(after Brazil) and WhatsApp is the second mostly used platform with a 93 
percent social network penetration [8]. The movement #YoSoy132 
emerged in 2012 during the Mexican federal elections process. From its 
emergence, the central concern of #YoSoy132 has been the 
democratization of the Mexican media. This concern is understandable 
considering that two media giants (Televisa and TV Azteca) dominate 99 
percent of Mexico’s audience and advertising market. The #YoSoy132 
movement criticized the dangerous interconnections between Mexican 
media and politics as the central obstacle to informing the citizenry. To 
fight against the concentrated Mexican media system, the movement 
unbridled the full potential of social media. To investigate #YoSoy132, I 
carried out a multimodal ethnography comprised of 75 individual semi-
structured interviews with activists from diverse collectives across various 
areas of Mexico, as well as four group interviews with activists from 
Mexico City, Guadalajara and Querétaro. My research specifically 
addressed key informants who created and managed digital platforms, had 
a prominent role in handling relations with the press, or were active 
participants in the ‘Media Taskforce’ for the democratization of the 
Mexican media. The ethnography also comprised several short periods of 
participant observation (during 2012, 2013, and 2014) in demonstrations, 
meetings and assemblies, both at the local and at the national levels, 
along with participation to informal encounters, and academic venues with 
dialogue between scholars and activists. A qualitative content analysis was 
performed on digital media and online platforms, including the official Web 
site of the movement, Facebook pages, chats, and groups, Twitter 
accounts, WhatsApp messages of local committees and collectives, 
documents, posters, leaflets and manifestos produced by protesters in 
diverse Mexican cities.
The second case study I draw on is the 15M movement emerged in 2011 
in Spain. This movement was able to develop sophisticated forms of digital 
political action, appropriating a wide ecology of digital communication 
technologies for effective organization, mobilization, content diffusion, 
collective identity creation and maintenance. The Spanish movement has 
represented an extraordinary pole of technological experimentation and 
innovation that has contributed to reconfigure democratic practices in the 
Spanish context. Spain is a particularly fertile ground for the use of mobile 
devices, with the smartphone being the most popular digital 
communication device, used by 61 percent of the population aged 15 and 
over (ONTSI, 2016). Data from 2018 display an overall smartphone 
penetration of 72.5 percent (making it the eight country in the world 
according to the Global Mobile Market Report by Newzoo) [9]. Since 
mobile data are mostly commercialized through flat rates that exclude 
traditional SMS, Spanish have enthusiastically adopted WhatsApp. Young 
people have implemented this platform as a meaningful app since 2011 
(Rubio Romero and Perlado Lamo de Espinosa, 2015), but new research 
show that old people have integrated it as well in their everyday practices 
(Fernández-Ardévol and Rosales, 2017). My findings rely on 20 in-depth 
interviews with social movement and media activists, in particular people 
who played key roles in organizing and producing media about the anti-
austerity protests, including journalists, Web managers and developers, 
social media curators, graphic designers, media activists and precarious 
media researchers.
The third data set is comprised by interviews conducted in 2017 with a 
range of different actors interested in fighting corruption and around the 
issue of job precarity in the Spanish context. Eleven interviews were 
carried out with journalists, politicians, activists, trade unions leaders and 
civil society organizations. The first data set was uploaded, organized and 
analyzed with the NVivo software, the second with Atlas.ti and the third 
one with MaxQDA. For this article, the most relevant interviews from each 
data set that mentioned the use of WhatsApp (and others apps like 
Telegram, Signal and XMPP) were brought together in a new data set 
comprising 30 interviews. These were re-coded using NVivo and re-
analyzed with a focus on the role of WhatsApp and other backstage apps.
Findings and discussion
WhatsApp and the politics of backstage activism in the #YoSoy132 
movement
During 2012 and 2013, while the gaze of Mexican scholars was almost 
obsessively centered on scrutinizing the frontstage of Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube (harnessing data from newsfeeds, streams, posts and 
videos), #YoSoy132 activists were already intensively engaging in 
practices of backstage activism on both Facebook chats and WhatsApp 
groups. These online spaces represented environments where activists 
‘carried out multiple activities’ (Interview 1), where ‘discussions and 
information upgrades were constant and very intense’ (Interview 2). 
Within these digital backstage realms, WhatsApp in particular played a 
fundamental role. Mexican activists started to use it weeks after the 
emergence of the movement in 2012, when they realized it provided them 
with ‘quicker’, ‘faster’, ‘simpler’, ‘more immediate’ communicative 
possibilities. At first, they experimented with one-to-one messages, but 
they almost immediately switched to group conversations to better ‘tackle 
organizational issues’ (Interview 3) and ‘make collective decisions simpler’ 
(Interview 4). While the use of WhatsApp to support and ease the 
organizational and decision-making process of the movement was an 
important aspect, the continuous flow of messages also generated a 
propitious environment where more intimate messages were exchanged. 
This was often the result of the immense pressure Mexican activists were 
under during the electoral process, with journalists continuously pushing 
for interviews, members of the PRI party trying to sabotage their digital 
tactics and police forces supported by the government sifting through 
social media profiles to identify and target key protesters (Treré, 2019). In 
contrast to a celebratory literature that praised the virtues of allegedly 
revolutionary digital platforms, my research shows the hard journey of a 
movement that was plagued by both multiple internal organizational 
conflicts and by governments continuous efforts to control, monitor and 
censor protest activities.
Within a situation that activists described as ‘social media paranoia’, a 
generic sense of anxiety regarding the negative consequences that their 
social media protest-related activities could generate (especially on the 
public and exposed social media frontstage), activists often turned to 
backstage forms of activism on WhatsApp. Group conversations were 
perceived as ‘safer’ and ‘more comfortable’ digital areas where activists 
could ‘open up to comrades about personal feelings and the stress 
experienced within the mobilizations’ (Interview 5); ‘comfort each other 
and blow off some steam’ (Interview 6); ‘find the strength and the 
motivation not to give up’ (Interview 7); ‘share thoughts, videos, laughs 
and pictures with like-minded people without the fear of being harshly 
criticized or attacked’ (Interview 8). Hence, WhatsApp messages shared 
across multiple groups established ‘sheltered’ areas where activists could 
express themselves far from the pressures and anxieties of the social 
media frontstage, the ‘official lights of Facebook walls and pages’ 
(Interview 9). Backstage practices on WhatsApp contributed to reinforce 
the internal solidarity and nurture the collective identity of the movement. 
Here, we can appreciate the power of the ‘emotion work’ (Jasper, 2011) in 
relation to collective identity, as #YoSoy132 activists experienced joy, 
relief and empowerment during their encounter and sharing with others 
through WhatsApp.
Further, within backstage spaces, activists were able to connect their 
struggle to the Mexican rebellious tradition, thus reaffirming the legitimacy 
of the #YoSoy132 movement as heir of a long history of Mexican 
resistance. Activists exchanged pictures, videos, audio files and memes of 
important Mexican revolutionary figures such as Emiliano Zapata and 
Subcomandante Marcos. These files where often accompanied by 
‘incitement texts’ that explicitly linked the present situation to the 
injustices of the past. In so doing, activists reminded themselves of the 
historical role they were playing in the Mexican political context, 
strengthening their reciprocal ties and reinforcing their identity as a 
coherent collective entity fighting against injustice. Pictures and memes 
were also shared widely on the frontstage of social media, but the 
meaning they acquired within WhatsApp groups was rather different. 
While on the frontstage the aim was to ‘make a message go viral reaching 
as many people as possible’ (Interview 10), in the backstage messages 
where targeted to smaller collectives with a higher degree of intimacy 
resembling the functioning of small mailing lists (Kavada, 2009). Their aim 
was to ‘have a laugh with friends and comrades’ (Interview 11), ‘to wink 
at someone online with whom you have shared so many adventures’ 
(Interview 12). Through these multimedia exchanges, activists nurtured 
reciprocal ties of solidarity and commitment, a necessary component in 
the management of collective identities (Flesher Fominaya, 2010). Within 
these more informal, relaxed and personal settings, protesters reaffirmed 
daily their ‘sense of being together, of being YoSoy132, and of what this 
belonging meant’ (Interview 13). In contrast to a more ‘official’ and 
‘serious’ frontstage presence, backstage environments were often 
pervaded by humor, irony and mockery. Mexican activists perceived 
WhatsApp groups as spaces in which they could ‘interact less seriously, 
cracking jokes at our friends’ (Interview 13). Frequently, they would 
circulate parodies and photomontages directed at the same members of 
the groups, engaging in acts of ‘self-mockery’ (Interview 13). These 
humorous practices reinforced activists’ belonging to the movement, 
displaying that protesters shared a ‘common code’ (Interview 14), ‘a 
similar understanding’ (Interview 15), but served also to ‘lower the 
intensity of the protest’ (Interview 16) and ‘find some peace within the 
relentless pace of resistance’ (Interview 17).
The implications of social media paranoia were often mitigated in the 
backstage. At the end of 2012, when the repressive strategies of the 
government impelled activists to erase protest-related pictures, posts and 
sometimes their whole public profiles from Facebook and YouTube, 
WhatsApp groups witnessed instead an intensification of exchanges. They 
were filled with self-mockery, satire and puns that contributed to ease the 
tension and the inner conflicts of the movement, while strengthening its 
internal solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, WhatsApp groups acted as 
key spaces to coordinate mobilizations and street protests, with activists 
on the ground and from home ‘informing comrades of the dangers, threats 
and repression from the police in real time’ (Interview 18). These findings 
illuminate the everyday ambivalences in activists’ uses of social media. 
Protesters constantly navigate and cope with the polarity between the 
paranoia evoked by the frontstage and the sheltered space incarnated by 
the backstage.
The role of WhatsApp in the backstage tactics of the 15M 
movement
Through the tactical appropriation of social media and the savvy hijacking 
of their algorithms, the 15M movement that emerged in 2011 in Spain — 
the so-called Indignados — was capable not only of launching calls for 
action and organizing massive mobilizations but also of systematically 
influencing journalistic coverage and situating its claims in the media 
agenda. For instance, through effective tactics of social media 
appropriation, Spanish activists were able to achieve that their 15 May call 
for action was mentioned 37 times by the printed press (Candón Mena, 
2013), and in many other occasions they obtained international press 
coverage in newspapers such as the Washington Post and the New York 
Times, making it impossible for Spanish mainstream media to ignore and 
silence their demands. One of the most effective tactics adopted by 15M 
activists consisted in the ‘systematic creation of trending topics on Twitter’ 
(Interview 19) that relied on a profound understanding and exploitation of 
the platform’s algorithm. However, adopting an ecological gaze, we can 
appreciate that the Twitter trending topics were just the frontstage result 
of a complex ecology of practices that were orchestrated in the backstage, 
with WhatsApp playing a key role. Indeed, these tactics were carefully 
planned relying on a combination of internal communication technologies 
and social media platforms, at the interstice between the communicative 
backstage and the frontstage. Internal communication tools, such as pads 
(online notepads for collective writing, such as Titanpad) were used to 
‘collectively select possibly successful hashtags and then build the 
narrative of the protest’ (Interview 20), while the frontstage of social 
media platforms like Twitter was employed to massively spread the 
information and attain the desired outcome. Inside the pads, activists first 
suggested diverse potential hashtags to reach an agreement over the 
most effective ones for the specific political campaign that was arranged. 
Once a hashtag was picked, an array of potential tweets was created 
accordingly and then sent to other activist collectives through backstage 
tools as direct messages on Twitter, e-mail messages and WhatsApp. 15M 
activists could rely on a ‘very powerful network of multiple WhatsApp 
groups that were activated when we needed them with a very fast 
turnaround and extensive diffusion’ (Interview 21). Behind the successful 
invention of Twitter hashtags, a submerged network of backstage activists 
was working incessantly to make sure that specific tweets were used 
simultaneously in different part of Spain and of the world to achieve the 
desired outcome. This effective coordination mainly relied on the 
communicative affordances of WhatsApp groups.
In subsequent ramifications of the Indignados in 2013, the Russian mobile 
Telegram app was introduced along with WhatsApp, in part because of the 
superior level of encryption that it provided, together with its ‘powerful 
capabilities for multimedia and managing groups when used in its desktop 
version’ (Interview 22) (see also Martínez Martínez, 2017).
The banality of WhatsApp within contemporary Spanish 
organizations
The interviews carried out with multiple Spanish organizations and 
activists in 2017 make it abundantly clear that the smartphone is one of 
the most used digital devices within the everyday dynamics of collectives 
and groups. People underlined that they are ‘constantly using their phone’ 
(Interview 23) and that ‘the supremacy of mobile phones is rather clear’ 
(Interview 24). Smartphones are seen as an all-in-one portable activist 
toolkit, an indispensable companion offering on-the-go connectivity and 
multimedia affordances through mobile instant messaging apps as 
WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal and XMPP. Smartphones also allow checking 
e-mail messages, news, recording sound and video, making calls and 
taking high definition pictures. More specifically, the powerful ensemble of 
smartphones and WhatsApp is seen to constitute the communicative core 
of Spanish organizations. ‘WhatsApp groups are essential, our most 
important organizational resource’ (Interview 25), and the possibility to 
create specific WhatsApp groups to ‘mirror each sub-commission or 
internal division’ (Interview 26) renders this platform a very dynamic and 
malleable choice for organizations. WhatsApp is perceived as ‘rapid’, 
‘effective’, ‘simple’ and for many interviewees its strength lies in allowing 
quicker responses and actions to everyday urgent matters that require 
immediate actions. Mailing lists are still used, but they seem to have 
reconfigured their role within the media ecology. They constitute more 
official communicative channels where messages that require to be 
recorded and processed at a slower pace are circulated. There also seems 
to be a hierarchy in the ecology of mobile apps. WhatsApp is the ‘most 
used, popular and widespread’ (Interview 27), while ‘Telegram is 
especially used by communication professionals and politicians but not so 
popular and spread as WhatsApp’ (Interview 28). Other apps as Signal 
and XMPP are only used by activists and professionals who require ‘a high 
level of encryption’ (Interview 29) and ‘adhere to very strict security 
protocols’ (Interview 30). These latter apps are used to safeguard the 
identity of journalistic sources or communicate with people who have 
leaked classified documents. I clearly perceived the widespread, intensive 
and daily use of WhatsApp and Telegram in the Spanish context when I 
compared the media technologies that I have deployed to contact 
interviewees in my different fieldworks around Europe. While in Italy, 
Greece and the U.K., traditional e-mail messages and telephone calls 
would still play a fundamental role, in Spain is a rather common practice 
to approach politicians, journalists and heads of organizations through a 
WhatsApp or Telegram message. In some cases, after trying to reach 
them through multiple communicative channels, I found that these mobile 
apps were the only channels through which I would receive a feedback 
within a reasonable time limit. All these aspects contribute to paint a 
picture where diverse mobile messaging apps are now firmly situated as 
irreplaceable backstage tools within the everyday organizational dynamics 
of Spanish organizations.
Concluding remarks
In this article, relying on 30 interviews carried out in Mexico and Spain 
with a range of different actors (activists, journalists, civil society 
organizations, unions, etc.), I have shed light on the dynamics of 
backstage activism, with a specific focus on WhatsApp. Adding to a 
literature that has only very recently appraised the political use of 
WhatsApp — mainly stressing its damaging effects during elections — I 
have painted a multi-dimensional picture of this app. I have shown that 
WhatsApp have been integrated effectively in the protest media ecologies 
of social movements since 2011, and that the backstage environments 
constituted by WhatsApp groups have provided activists with spaces to 
reinforce their collective belonging to a common cause, cementing their 
internal solidarity and lowering the pressure and stress of protest-related 
activities. Within these spaces, activists have been often able to balance 
the consequences of the social media paranoia experienced in the 
frontstage of Facebook and Twitter through the continuous exchange of 
ironical material and intimate messages. Moreover, WhatsApp has been 
used as a potent organizational device, and it is now firmly integrated into 
the everyday practices of organizations and movements. In particular, 
social actors stress its crucial communicative affordances (speed, 
reliability, mobility, multimediality), in conjunction with the omnipresent 
smartphone. While recognizing the negative implications that its use has 
engendered during electoral times around the world, my qualitative 
ecological exploration also illustrates the ordinariness of WhatsApp and 
showcases its multiple roles within the submerged practices of movements 
and political organizations.
Given the growing social, economic and political relevance of WhatsApp 
and other similar messaging platforms as Telegram and Signal, it is 
essential for scholars to develop more fine-grained analyses of the 
practices unfolding in the backstage of digital activism. This has 
conceptual and methodological implications. At the conceptual level, it 
means privileging a media ecological lens, able to explore holistically and 
critically the communicative complexity of social movements and 
organizations, foregrounding the dynamics of the frontstage, the 
backstage and their interplay. At the methodological level, it implies 
favoring multi-method studies that capitalize on the integration between 
large-scale quantitative explorations of the social media frontstage and 
nuanced qualitative inquiries into digital backstage worlds. 
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